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l. Introduction
Whether there will ever be a European public prosecutor,s
Office.(EPPO) is highly uncertain, bui that is,not the question
that this article discusses. suppose that such an Bppoiill be
established, it can be asked how it would function in the
Member states that will participate in it. The more specific
question that this article does discuss is how the Eppo ïoold
function in the Member states in which the national prosecution
Service enjoys a considerable scope of discretion in the
execution of its duties. That question is particularly important
against the background of the proposal tã establistr un'Bppo,
based on a supposed ineffectivenesi of national criminar justice
systems in fighting criminal offences that harm the Euiopean
union's financial interestsl. This ineffectiveness could be partly
related to an element of the criminal justice system which is
i !h D" Faculty of Law, Leiden University.
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strikingly dissimilar across the lJnion: the scope of
prosecutorial discretion of the Public Prosecution Service2. A
wide scope of discretion could lead the Public Prosecution
Service to attach low levels of priority to European fraud cases,
whereas a restricted scope of discretion or rather a system of
mandatory prosecution might lead to high levels of prosecution
and conviction because of the fact that the Prosecution Service
is simply unable to refrain from deciding to prosecute.
In this article, I will focus on the possible questions that
arise relating to the embedding of a future EPPO in a countr5r
with a wide scope of prosecutorial discretion. The basic thought
is clearly that the EPPO would be in the position to ensure that
a case of EU fraud is prosecuted in such a Member State3.
Coupled to the fact that the EPPO itself will be bound to a
principle of mandatory prosecutiona, the effect on the actual
decision-making is considerable. Another thing is how the
institution of the EPPO would operate within a legal
environmentthat is adjusted to a Prosecution Service of quite a
different nature, enjoying much scope for discretion. Criminaljustice systems with such a Public Prosecution Service have
found other ways to steer the execution of its duties in the right
direction than to introduce mandatory prosecution.
The question as to how this EPPO might be embedded in
such a system will however not be answered here in such a
general sense. Instead, I will direct the attention to what is
perhaps the prime example of a criminal justice system that
bestows on its Public Prosecution Service a wide scope of
discretion: the Dutch system. Theoretically, the Dutch Public
Prosecution Service enjoys an almost unlimited discretions.
While it was recognized that such a scope of discretion might
2 J. FroNoa, Public Prosecutors and Díscretion, Clarendon, 1995; J.-M.
Jernn - M. V/eos (eds.), Coping with Overloaded Criminal Justice Systems.
The Rise o1f Prosecutorial Power Across Europe, Springer, 2006;8.G. LUNA -
M. W¿¡8, The Prosecutor in Transnational Perspective, Oxford University
Press 2012; M. CATANIELLo - J. S. Hoocso¡.r, Discretionary Criminal Justice
in a Comparative Context, CarolinaAcademic Press,2015.
3 As explained in the explanatory memorandum to the Proposal for a
Council Regulation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor's
Offrce, COM(2013) 534 (hercafter: the proposal), p.2.
* Recital 20 to the proposal.s W. Gnsruor.lo, IIet opportuniteitsbeginsel en het recht van de
Europese Unie. Een onderzoek naar de betekenis van strafvorderlijke
beleidsvrijheid in de geëuropeaniseerde rechtsorde (diss. Leiden), Kluwer,
20t3.
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produce results that can be seen as undesirable, the system was
not adapted in a way that restricted discretion, but rather its use
was organised in such a way that most of the adverse
consequences could be prevented: a complex system of checks
and balances evolved
These checks and balances can be divided in elements
relating to judicial conkol and elements relating to democratic
accountability. This article will try to analyse potential
difficulties in the embedding of the Eppo in the Dutchtriminaljustice system (and perhaps in other systems sharing its
characteristics) along the lines of these two erements of control.
Therefore, the article proceeds as follows. Firstly, I will
make some preliminary remarks as to the nature of the
envisaged EPPO and more specifically to certain particularities
that hamper its functioning in a system which is geared to
controlling discretion. secondly, r will introduce the Dutch wayin which the Public Prosecution Service is organised and
functions. That part centres on the crucial concept of the
expediency principle. Thirdly, I will investigate the connections
of a future EPPO with the system of democratic accountability
and the influence of political officials in the functioning of the
prosecution. Fourthly, I will do the same with the system ofjudicial control and review of decision*making. In the end, this
analysis leads to some . considerations on the possible
embedding of the EPPO in a system which is designed to
counterbalance prosecutorial discretion. In these considerations
I will also reflect on reasons why such an EppO might be hard
to reconcile with structural characteristics of this particular type
of a criminal justice system.
2. Tlne rationale behind the European public prosecutor's
Office
The reasons behind the move to establish an EppO seem
straightforward. Quantitative analysis points out that actions tofight offences against the financial interests of the EuropeanIjnion are not impressive and, moreover, show significant
differences across Member States.6 This analysis could be
6 Impact Assessment Accompanying the proposal for a Council
Regulation on the establishment of the European public prosecutor,s office,
swD(2o13)274.
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viewed, perhaps from the point of the European anti-fraud
agency OLe¡', as showing a lact< of ambition from the side of
rãtiottut prosecutors and investigators when it comes to fighting
Europeai fraud cases. OLAF keeps at least a close watch on
Member States' actions following up on OLAF investigations'7
From the point of view of natioãal prosecutors, the fairly low
track recoid could also be seen as being caused by a less-than-
adequate implementation of criminalisation requirements' by
insufficient case reports tt.rat ate sent from OLAF to national
prosecution servicei for a follow-up or simply by unwillingness
ty judges to come to a conviction or to impose substantial
penalties.
The question which shortcomings hinder or even obstruct
the frght ágainst EU fraud the most is a diffrcult one, and one
that will not be answered here. The fact is that the proposal for a
regulation on the establishment of the EPPO clearly departs
frãm the idea that the use of criminal law in the fight against
fraud is ineffective in some Member states because of limited
priority-setting from the side of the national Public Prosecution
^Servi"ês. The proposed legislative framework does not contain
detailed provisions on offènce defrnitions, as these are left to
the propãsed directiv e tltat !s supposed to replace the PIF
Convention and its protocols.s The proposed legal framework
also refrains from láying down detailed rules on investigative
measures, leaving these to national law while only requiring
some basic standards.e Practically the only section where the
proposed EPPO regulation directly overlaps national provisions
ãn èriminal procedirre and presents some selÊstanding rules, is
the decision to prosecute' which includes rules on non-
prosecution, on chãosing.the place to prosecute' on transaction
änd choice of indictment.lo
The original proposal coupled these provisions with a
principle of áandator! pto.""ution, since that principle would
ärrrrr." legal certainty and a policy of zero tolerance towards
7 see the OLAF Report 2014, Luxembourg: Publications office of the
European Union, 2075,P- 23-24-"*-i t.óãrãfl* 
uóir""tive of the European Parliament and of the Council
on the fijht against fraud to the unionk financial interests by means of
criminal law, COM(20 12)363.
--*:t?orn;ur" 
uii"t" ía ot ttr. proposal to article 25 of council doc. no
11045/75.
10 Council doc. no 11045/15, art- 29-30 and33-34'
offences affecting the lJnion's financial interestsll. The rules on
non-prosecution and transaction therefore limit the strictness of
the principle of mandatory proceedings. Another element of the
proposed legislative framework concerns the division of
competences between the EPPO and national authorities. While
the original proposal envisioned an exclusive competence of the
EPPO for all offences that would be harmonised in the PIF
Directivel2, during the negotiations the Council changed this
into a priority competence of the EPPO, which also enjoys a
right of evocation vis-à-vis the national Public Prosecutor's
Officel3. The proposal initially explained its choice for an
exclusive competence by claiming it would ensure consistency
and provide steering of investigations and prosecutions at lJnion
levella.
These reasons clearly show that the EPFO was proposed to
take a strong lead in the fight against EU fraud, ensuring that
investigations and prosecutions would be carried out while
improving equality and consistency at the same time.
Negotiations in the Council changed the apparent rationale
behind the EPPO to a considerable degree. The exclusive
competence was not the only victim, but also the structure of
the Office was adapted. The proposed legislative framework has
moved away from a strong and independent office, executing its
duties independently from national prosecutors, towards a
collegial, multi-level body acting for some puq)oses in close
cooperation with national prosecutorstt. As a result, it can be
said that the Member States are in a better position to somehow
influence the functioning of the EPPO, and consistency and
effectiveness are perhaps less secured. Naturally, attl;le time of
writing of this article it remains to be awaited what the eventual
setup of the EPPO and the rules for its functioning willbe.
Ilowever, there is not much left of the starting point that
the EPPO would provide a structure to force Member States to
investigate and prosecute cases of EU fraud. Nevertheless, in
the legislative framework as it stands after serious deliberations
within the Council, the EPPO retains strong elements that reveal
its nature as an Office which is designed to ovemrle low levels
1r Proposal, rccital20.
12 Proposal, art. 71, par. 4.
13 Council doc.nr. ll}45/15, art.2O.
ra Proposal, recital 23.
rs Council doc.nr. 10264/15, art.7-12
(Ol Wolfers Kh¡wer
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of priority-setting by national Public Prosecution Services.
These characteristics show that it is, by its nature, a
prosecutorial body which has to exercise its functions with a
iimited scope of discretion, and bound to take a strong stand
against EU fraud offences. It is therefore strikingly dissimilar to
some of the national Public Prosecution Services in the Union
that enjoy a wide scope of prosécutorial discretion. Hereafter I
will try to analyse which difficulties arise when such an EPPO
has to function within a legal environment which is not directly
fit to receive it.
3. The expediency princiPle
One of the central elements that define the prosecutorial
task is the scope of discretion that is bestowed upon
proseeutors, which, as mentioned above, varies significantly
across Member States.
Some countries, like the Netherlands, offer the Public
Prosecutor's Office a wide scope of discretion in deciding about
the prosecution of criminal offencesl6, while others restrict the
available ohoices to a large extent. The latter are said to have
accepted the principle of mandatory prosecution, or the legality
principle, which obliges the prosecutor to instigate prosecutions
in case he can prove that a certain criminal offence took place.
Countries that do not accept such an obligation generally
provide in their codes for the possibility that a case be
ãismissed when prosecution is not in the public interest. This is
called the expediency principle.
More specifically, criminal law theory distinguishes
between two variants of the expediency principle and uses the
term 'negative interpretation of the expediency principle' when
it is held that dismissing a case should be the exception to the
rule that all cases should be prosecuted. Conversely, the term
'positive interpretation of the expediency principle' means that
sõme country's law holds that prosecution should only take
place when an offence can be proven and, additionally, tt would
fe in the public interest to start a prosecutionlT.
t6 Code of Criminal Procedure, art. 167, 242.
17 See W. Geetnom, Het opportuniteitsbeginsel en het recht van de
Europese (Jnie. Een onderzoek naar de betekenis van strafvorderlíjke
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Usually, the expediency principle is not defined in such a
black-or-white manner, reflecting instead elements from both
interpretations. That is also the case in the Netherlands, where
the expediency principle can best be interpreted as enabling
prosecutors to use the public interest as a criterion in
prosecutorial decision-making, as opposed to the legality
principle in which they cannot do so.
Granting the Public Prosecution Service a wide scope of
discretion causes that Service to set up its own standards and
policy documents, in order to maintain a consistent and equal
functioning within its jurisdiction. At least, this happened in the
Netherlands, where the Prosecution Service started to issue
guidelines for prosecutors, initially mainly for smaller crimes
and misdemeanours for which this unifying policy was much
needed. Later, also more serious criines were includedls.
Prosecution guidelines were also published in the Government
Gazetûe, which made the public and, more importantly, defence
lawyers aware of the policy that the Prosecution Service wished
to pursue for a certain type of crime. Courts then started to
accept complaints against prosecutorial decision-making which
diverted from the published guidelines, and declared the
prosecution in these cases inadmissiblere. The legal value of
these guidelines became therefore very significant, almost to the
point that they could be qualified as delegated law-making. It is
also argued that these guidelines facilitate a transparent,
efficient and centralised priority-setting in criminal law
enforcement.
The operation of these guidelines was further strengthened
and simplified by the introduction of a computer-aided system
of case processing, which indicated the desired decision in the
case on the basis of the applicable guidelines2O. Clerks working
for the Public Prosecution Service operated this system and
made the decisions it indicated or prepared them for the
prosecutor. This system is now in the process of being
beleidswijheid in de geëuropeaniseerde rechtsorde (diss. Leiden), Kluwer,
2013.
r8 J.P. Husrnvx, De ontwikkelíng van het Openbaar Minísteríe tot
beleidvoerend orgaan, in W. C. vAN BTNSBERceN et al (eds.), Handhaving van
de rechtsorde,Zwolle: W.E.J. Tjeenk Willink, 1988, p.95-112.te Supreme Court of thó Netherlands, 19 Jine 1990, Nederlandse
Jurisprudentíe 1991 , 119.
20 This system was called 'BOS-polaris'.
abolished, with the reason that a non-automated set of
guidelines will offer prosecutors more possibilities to take all
particularities ofa case into account.
4. Structure and hierarchy in the Prosecution Service
V/hile the Dutch Code of Criminal Procedure offers
prosecutors a wide scope of discretion, individual members of
the Public Prosecution Service cannot always use this discretion
as they like. This Service is a strictly hierarchical body, in
which higher-ranking prosecutors can issue binding decisions to
lower-level prosecutors2t. There is a College of Procurators-
General on top of the hierarchy, which issues the guidelines and
is, additionally, competent to issue instructions on any subject
matter to the members of the Service2'. One special part of the
Service that should be named here is the so-called Functional
Public Prosecutor's Office, which is especially tasked to handle
fraud and environmental cases23. Doing so, the Prosecution
Service sets these cases apart from regular cases because there
is a risk that these cases receive low levels of attention 'and
priority because of their time-consuming nature.
This legal environment in which the Dutch Public
Prosecution Service operates is characterizedby the wide scope
of discretion that the expediency principle offers to the Service.
When an EPPO is introduced which is bound by a principle of
mandatory prosecution (in other words: the legality principle),
its setup is pervaded by a completely different philosophy. The
choice between legality and expediency as leading principles is
not an insignificant detail but has far-reaching consequences.
As explained above, the wide scope of discretion that the
Dutch Public Prosecution Service enjoys is kept in check
because the Service is constituted as a hierarchical body that,
moreover, limits its own decision-making by issuing guidelines
that have a binding nature for its task fulfilment. The centralised
prosecutorial policy that is produced as a result ofthis setup is
however vulnerable for outside influence, which could endanger
its consistency and the effectiveness in which it tailors
2l Judicial Organization Act, art. 136- I 38.22 Judicial Organization Act, art. 130 par. 4; Code of Criminal
Procedure, art. 8.
" Code of Criminal Procedure, aft.9 par.3.
investigatory and prosecutorial capacity towards certain types
of criminality. when the Eppo sets other priorities than the
national Prosecution Service does, it will intrude on the
consistency of the prosecutorial policy. To be sure, it could be
said that the safeguarding of the union budget is in fact the
general interest that the EPpo aims at. And if it is the case that
the national Public Prosecution service akeady attaches much
value to this interest, it cannot be expected thaithe introduction
of the EPPO changes much. Conversely, if the national
prosecution policy does not prioritise the fight against EU fraud,
it would be perfectly justified if the Eppo fout¿ strengthen thé
efforts in that field.
_ 
On a more practical level, other problems may arise. Withthe establishment of the EppO, there is an additional
hierarchical structure introduced. The central office of the
EPPO, which is itself a complex body, is placed hierarchically
1bo.ve the European Delegated prosecutois who carry out theduties of the EPPO in the national courts and act as
prosecutorsto. These European Delegated prosecutors will
most probably be national prosecutors who are granted the
additional European capacity, and therefor" po*"r, u ,o_
called 'double hatted' nature. If that is the case, ìhey will have
to give priority to their European mandate in cases in which
national and European priorities diverge. That these priorities
will diverge is the basic assumption behind the proposal.
These prosecutors will thus be placed in a double -chåin of
command in which the priorities pursued by the different
hierarchical structures produce a conflict of interests. It is
necessary to provide for a solution for this conflict and that
solution is a procedural one, according to the proposed
legislative framework. The rather complex procedure involvesthe, centrally located, European proiecutor who, in
consultation with the national authorities, shall determine
whether the European Delegated prosecutor will have to give
priority to his Europ ean mandate2s .
This method could be appropriate to solve difficult
conflicts at the prosecutorial level. However, there is currently
no provision foreseen that enables the EppO to not only
ovemrle national prosecutorial policy-setting, but also priority-
2a Council doc. nr. 10264/15,art. 12par. I
25 Council doc. nr. 10264/15,afi. l2þar.3
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26 Council doc' nr. 10264lL5,art' 5 the princiPle
ofloyal
authorities. As these
setting at the investigative level26' The idea apparently is that
tn" nírop"un Delegatid Prosecutor possesses the competence to
steer investigations and to direcf investigative capaclty 10
predetermin.id 
"uræ 
oi typ"* of cases' This might become-the
ãrãr" ¿ifft""lt part of thá'practical development of the EPPO'
Wlii tt b. pos;ible for the Delegated European Prosecutor to
allocate the resources that it considers necessary or advisable in
order to fulfrll its ,utf. ãi frghtine fraud effectivelV? How yifl
ã""t*¿ struggles for-inuestigdñe capacity be settled? Will it
påtft"p- U" Jå effective to ãoncludeägreements with national
irtãtiiÁt itt authorities as to the numbei of personnel available
for EPPO investigationsi O', if 
'hut 
all proves too difficult' will
there in the end be a strengthening of the investigative function
ui,rttr.rrop"un l"','el ioiinstance at-oLAF? These questions
;;d;" terrãu, .onri¿L*tion before a legislative framework for
inJ Bppo is concludeã, bttut"t the effectiveness of the body
may depend on the solutions for this problem'
5. Democratic accountabilitY
The Dutch Public Prosecution Service is not only internally
structured in a trierarchi"ui *u*.r, which causes diffrculties in
reconciling it with u futo'" EPPO' It is also subordinated]"^:i:
fufirrirt"r õf Security and Justice, who has the power to-gwe
Ë.n"ruf guidelines ánJintt*"tions to the Service' but who 
is
also competent to 
^ltttt.1t, 
the Service regarding specific
..i*iouf cäses' The Minister can issue both instructions to start
prosecutions, as wett as instructions to refrain from
prosecution2T.
In the first case, the instruction must be entered into the
.ur"il", in order f* it to become known to the judge handling
the oase- and, if a 1rial is held, to become publicly hoYl 1t"
we1128. In the ,""onJãt", thairesult is logically impossible if
the instruction would be entered into prosecution records only'
Therefore, in 
"ur.r**ttere 
the Minister instructs the Public
par. 6 refers to
of investigativecooperation which will guide the action
loyal cooPeration duties alreadY exist in art.4par.3TEU and art. 325 
TFEU,
it is unclear what this provlslon exactþ adds.
27 Judicial Organization Act art' 127
'8 Judicial Organization Act art' 128 
par.5
Prosecution Service to refrain from prosecuting, he has to
inform Parliament of his decision.2e This will make his
instructions publicly known, and will also enable Parliament to
hold the Minister accountable for his actions and, if it is
dissatisfied with these actions, force his removal from office.
This is a possibility, since the Ministry of Security and Justice's
accepted superiority over criminal law enforcement is not
excluded from the general rule that Parliament can remove the
entire cabinet or an individual minister if it is dissatisfied with
its functioning and ceases to entrust the powers of government
to the cabinet or the minister30. Criminal law enforcement is
generally considered to be so intrusive in individual lives and so
crucial to the daily functioning of society, that offiee-holders in
this field should be subjected to democratic control.
Here, the envisaged legal framework for the EPPO also
shows a different philosophy. The European Chief Prosecutor
will be appointed by the European Parliament and the
Council3l, the other European Prosecutors will be nominated by
the Member States and selected by the Council.3z No European
institution, including the European Commission will be
competent to instruct the EPPO on general matters or in
individual cases". If serious problems arise, the Commission
may submit a request to the Court of Justice asking for a
dismissal of a European (Chief) Prosecutor. The same
competence is given to the Council and the European
Parliament3a. Therefore, there is no afïangement for democratic
accountability for the EPPO's actions at the European level
which is comparable to the one on the national level. This could
lead the Dutch Parliament to question the legitimacy of the
EPPO, as there is no govemment official who can be questioned
and held accountable for its functioning.
An altemative would be that the Minister of Security and
Justice will be held accountable, although he does not possess
the power to issue instructions to the European Delegated
'n Judicial Organization Act art. 128 par. 6.
'o This is an unwritten rule in Dutch constitutional law. The govemment
does not need a vote of confidence before it is able to take up its duties, but it
may be removed if a parliamentary motion of non-confidence is carried.
3r Council doc.ttr. 10264115, art. 1.3.
32 Council doc.nr. 10264/15, art.14.
33 Council doc.nr. 10264115, art. 6.
3a Council doc:tt. 10264115, art. 13 par. 4, art. 14 par.5.
^ 
\rr-r¿-.- ø¡--,-.--
Prosecutor. A lack of powers of instructions normally is a
complete obstacle to parliamentary accountabilþ for the
Prosecution Service's acts, but it has to be awaited whether
Parliament can resist the temptation to call the Minister to
account when problems with the EPPO arise..From a Ðutch
point of view it is therefore not very desirable that no
government official can be held accountable for EPPO's
functioning, and that there are only limited possibilities for
political control over it.
This could lead to reluctance when the Dutch govenrment
has to decide on whether to participate in the EPPO or not; and
as well to uncomfortable situations when the Office will be set
up as proposed. But perhaps these objections can be overcome
it in addition to a limited system of political contròI, a solid
system ofjudicial conhol is set up.
6. Judicial control
The wide scope of discretion that the Dutch ,Public
Prosecution Service eq,oys is not only held in check by the fact
that it forms its decisions within a hierarchical system under
political control. Another very.important element in the system
of checks and balances surrounding prosecutorial decision-
making is the way in which judicial control over these decisions
is possible. This system provides for two methods of review;
dependent on the type ofdecision.
A decision not to pfosecute may be challenged in court by
any directly interested party3s. This also counts for a deoision to
impose a penal order and a decision to offer a tuansaction;
because these all lead to out-of-court settlements3u. The directþ
interested party may lodge its complaint at the Court.of Appeal
of the region where the decision not to prosecute was taken.
This Court of Appeal has to decide on questions of fact and law
and on expediency as well37. It can order the Prosecution
Service to instigate proceedings or start a preliminary
investigation, it can indicate the offence that must be used for
the indictment and it can indicate the factual elements of the
35 Code of Criminal Pro cedtxe, art. 12.
'6 Code of Criminal Procedure, art; l2k37 Code of Criminal Procedure, art. llipar.2.
@ Wolters Kluwer
offence that should be included therein3s. If it rejects the
complaint of the direclly interested party, itthe Court of Appeat
may do so because of the reason that prosecution would noì ¡"in the general interest. That means thãt the court may refer to
any ground of expediency that it may find in the case.
A decision to start a prosecution may also be challenged in
court. That possibility is only open for the defendant un¿ ãun be
used in the form of a plea for inadmissibility of the case- ihegrounds for inadmissibility essentially amount to generalprinciples of law: rhe 
_equality principle, tfr. prio"iliã oilegitimate expectations,-the prohibition or arbitrariness *¿ tt"prohibition of disproportionality. However, some of these arequite strong while others are not. For instance, a case cantheoretically be declared inadmissible if the prosecutor decided
to start proceedings against the defendant while not prosecutins
a co-suspect in comparable circumstances3e. This type of appeai
to the equality principle hardly ever succeeds.
The fact that tnal courts can declare the prosecution
inadmissible is related to the wide scope of discretion the
Prosecution service enjoys: courts tend to;arginuuy.rt.rt irr"
way in whigh the prosecutor employs his discrãtioo, to pr.rr"ni
abuses and improper action. oné oi the most powerful tools inthis respect is the above-mentioned practice tirat courts u"".pt
complaints about prosecutorial decision-making which divertsfrom the Prosecution seryice's own guiderin"r. Th" basis for
this y found in the principle of legitimate expectations, which
entails that an individual muy e"peót not to be prosecute¿ irnis
case is qualified in the guidelines as not worthy ofprosecutiona.. Because of this state of affairs, trre guiãeline
system can be seen as a tool for firrther specification of-criminalliabilify. Reliance on the guideline system is not absolute,
however. Prosecutors may divert from settled prosecutoriaípolicy if they have good teasons and state these on t iulo].
- 
'8 Supreme Court of the Netherlands, 25 J*,e 1996, NederlandseJurisprudentie 1996, 714, C_ourt of Appeal of Amsterd a^, Zt'tunuy-iAOï,ECLI:NL:GHAMS :2009 :8H0496.
- 
3e supreme court of the Netherlands, 22 october r99r, NederrandseJurisprudent ie 1992. 282.
- 
a0 Supreme Court of the Netherlands, 13 September 1994, NederlandseJurisprudentie 1995. 3 l.
_ 
a' Supreme iourt of the Netherlands, 5 Ma¡ch 1991, Nederlandse
Ju ris prudent ie 199 l, 69 4.
lô \tr/^li--- rL,,-,^-
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This system of judicial review was developed in a long
process and reflects the desire to seriously control the
application of the expediency principle. That does not
necessarily mean that it is irreconcilable with an EPPO that
possesses striking differences in comparison with the Dutch
Public Prosecution Service. Some questions may arise however
and these will merit attention. The possibilities for complaints
against non-prosecution are for instance open for any directþ
interested parly. Mostþ this is the victim of the crime. For all
cases for which the EPPO will be competent, this interested
party will be the European Union. Could the Union, represented
by the European Commission, be admissible when it files a
complaint with a Dutch Court of Appeal against a decision of
the EPPO not to . prosecute a caÈe of EU fraud in the
Netherlands? For the Court of Appeal to be able to process such
a cornplaint, it is not necessary that there is a formal decision on
prosecution. Simply not starting proceedings can also be seen as
a decision against which a complaint is admissible. An offer for
a transaction or the issuing of a pen4l order is a d'ecision against
which a complaint is-admissible as well. If the European
Commission would be regarded as a directly interested pqrty
and its complaints would be admissible, it would lead to a
remarkable accumulation of capacities of the Union, which
could be seen as the victim, the investigator and the prosecutor
in one.
Another issue relates to the binding nature of prosecutorial
guidelines. The EPPO is probably going to formulate a policy
documenta2, or a yearþ report stating its intentions for the
fulfilment of its tasksa3. The question is whether these
publications could be viewed by the court as containing
itatements of a selÊbinding nature from which a defendant
could derive legitimate expectations with regard to the decisions
the EPPO will make in his case. A negative answer to this'
question could be based on the fact that the EPPO, contrary to
the natìonal Public Prosecution Service, does not enjoy a very
wide scope of discretion and therefore cannot restrict itself in
the exeroise of its policy freedom' That line of approach
emphasizes the European natufe of the EPPO. This however
does not clearly reflect recent developments in Council
a2 Proposal, reciøl 31.
43 Council doc. ru. 10264115, art. 6 par.2 and art' 6a.
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negotiations which tend to accentuate the national nature of
EPPO actions, the applicability of national law and the
involvement of the national judiciary. The logical consequence
seems to be that the EPPO, or rather the European Delegated
Prosecutor, will be seen by the court as a national prosecutor
and therefore subjected to national law and national standards
for judicial review. If these standards imply that policy
documents receive a relatively strong force in reviewing
prosecutorial decision-making, then that is something that the
EPPO will have to consider when starting a prosecution in the
Netherlands. According to this line of reasoning, the EppO will
be confronted with the particularities of the participating
Member States, each receiving it in its own manner and
applying its own standards with regard to its actions. That state
of affairs could seriously hamper its effectiveness, the
predictability of its actions and the equality of the outcomes.
7. Considerations on embedding the EPPO
If the basic thought behind the establishment of the EppO
is that Member States are not actively combating offences
affecting the financial interests of the Union, there is one
suspicious element of criminal procedure that could facilitate a
reserved approach by the Prosecution Service. That element is
the expediency principle. Enabling prosecutors to fulfil their
tasks with a wide scope of discretion, this principle gives rise to
other problems as well when the consequences of the
establishment of the EPPO are thought through. In order to
assess what problems may arise, this article used the Dutch
criminal justice system as an example of a system offering a
wide scope of discretion for prosecutorial decision-making.
The choice between legality and expediency is a starting
point for designing the rules relating to prosecution, and has
significant consequences for the system ofjudicial and political
review, for the room for policy-making and for the internal and
external strucfure of a prosecution service. The design of the
EPPO is markedly different from the characteristics of the
Dutch Public Prosecution Service, which enjoys ample freedom
in its decision-making. As these systems are destined to coexist
and even to converge in the person of the European Delegated
Prosecutor, tensions will arise there and possibly also elsewhere
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in the composite system of prosecution that results from the
introduction of the EPPO. Possibly decreasing the consistency
of a centralised prosecution policy, European priorities for
criminal law enforcement set by the EPPO will draw particular
attention to EU fraud. Due to the limited scope of this policy
field, the resulting incoherence in criminal law policy will
naturally be negligible. That will no longer be the case if the
competence of the EPPO in the future is extended to other
forms of serious crime.
Receiving an EPPO in a system that is used to control its
prosecution seruice in both the political and judicial context is
perhaps more difficult than acknowledging its deviating policy
choices. Two extremes are possible. The EPPO may be seen as
a purely national Prosecution Service for purposes of political
accountability and judicial review. In that case, the Minister of
Security and Justice could be held accountable for any failure of
the EPPO. Courts would use their national standards for review
of prosecutorial decision-making, including the rules on the
prosecutors' compliance with its own policy documents and
guidelines. The other possibility is that the EPPO is viewed as a
truly European body which is bound only by European law' In
that case, it would be impossible to hold any national official to
account for its functioning, and courts will probably show
considerable deference to its European background and not
impose national rules and standards upon it' The deliberations
on the EPPO proposal have shown a clear development towards
the first option: the EPPO should be regarded a national entity
as much as possible. At the same time, it should retain its
revolutionary characteristics, having the power to enforce that
offences against the financial interests of the European Union
will be prosecuted. That combination is undoubtedly causing
theoretical but also practicalproblems which will most probably
be encountered when the fîrst prosecutions ensue. The fact that
it is quite predictable which problems the embedding of the
EPPO might cause, could however also lead the governments of
certain Member States to seriously consider their involvement
in the project. The problems relating to the specific nature of the
criminal justice systems that offer considerable prosecutorial
discretion merit serious attention.
